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Current state
At a crossroads and fragmented, global public health 
surveillance is deﬁ  ned as the ongoing systematic collec-
tion, analysis, and interpretation of health data, essential 
to the planning, implementation, and evaluation of public 
health practice, closely integrated to the dissemination of 
these data to those who need to know and linked to 
prevention and control [1,2]. Global, siloed surveillance 
systems are often slow to detect, register, conﬁ  rm, 
analyze, and report cases of public health signiﬁ  cance, 
provide feedback, and communicate timely and useful 
information to stakeholders [3]. Further, they are neither 
maximally eﬀ  ective nor eﬃ   cient in guiding (and being 
guided by) appropriate interventions. As an essential 
public health function, surveillance is relatively poorly 
supported in terms of a global consensus policy, strategy, 
and governance model and adequate training and 
resources [4].
While the promise and intuitive added value of integrat-
ing public health surveillance highlighted in earlier reports 
[5] still remains valid (e.g., enhanced time  liness, increased 
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Public Healthcompleteness), many more resources and focused eﬀ  ort is 
required to fulﬁ  ll this dream that eludes even some of the 
more advanced and wealthy countries.
New movements have now come to the fore to expedite 
tomorrow’s digital, paperless public health surveillance 
workplace and promote comprehensive surveillance. 
Th   ere is strategic merit in conceiving a vision of the end 
state for comprehensive, global, multiple-hazard public 
health surveillance; one that acknowledges the challenges 
and identiﬁ  es steps to overcome them. We propose here 
a perspective for comprehensive, eﬀ  ective and eﬃ   cient 
global, multiple-hazard public health surveillance and 
describe a way forward to achieve it.
Global movements
Th   ree important movements now set the stage to achieve 
comprehensive, eﬀ  ective and eﬃ   cient global, multiple-
hazard public health surveillance:
1. Th  e adoption of the revised International Health 
Regulations [IHR(2005)] by all World Health Organi-
za  tion (WHO) Member States, which includes national 
obligations to achieve a set of core surveillance and 
response capacities to prevent the international spread 
of disease [6];
2. Th  e maturation of information sciences (e.g., public 
health informatics [PHI]) capabilities and the 
remarkable penetration of information technologies 
(IT) to the most distant parts of the globe [7]; and
3. A consensus that both the security and public health 
communities have overlapping interests and mutual 
beneﬁ  ts to collaborate in supporting the development 
of essential public health functions, especially public 
health surveillance [8].
Th  ese movements oﬀ   er the practical opportunity to 
empower, enhance, and enjoin global public health 
surveillance, as never before.
Movement 1 – Adoption of IHR(2005)
Th  e IHR(2005) constitutes the WHO’s legal and opera-
tional framework for activities around prevention and 
control of the international spread of disease, regardless 
of origin or intent (e.g., chemical and radio-nuclear 
sources, as well as biological). Th   e adoption of IHR(2005) 
by WHO Member States challenges them in a new and 
urgent way to assess and strengthen core surveillance 
capacities [9]. Th  is agreement also provides the policy 
context to uniformly assess these capacities [10].
Movement 2 – The rise of public health informatics (PHI)
Information sciences and IT both used in a public health 
setting (i.e., public health informatics) are a means to an 
end; the end being the achievement of eﬀ  ective  and 
eﬃ     cient public health surveillance. Concerned with 
eﬀ  ective and eﬃ   cient collection, collation, transmission, 
analyses, visualization, storage, and retrieval of electronic 
data, the scientiﬁ   c discipline of PHI has emerged to 
leverage the inherent merits found in IT and computer 
science technology. But this merger yields more than the 
sum of its individual parts—it has the potential to 
enhance the transformation to a 21st century global public 
health surveillance digital (paperless) workplace. By 
identifying and deﬁ   ning standards and making them 
easier to apply, PHI adds value to eﬀ  orts  already 
performed by public health practitioners at all health 
levels. Th   is added value derives from the inherent ability 
of PHI to facilitate digital communication in a more 
robust, eﬃ   cient, and standards-based manner.
Over the past ten years, many public health processes 
have been improved by PHI solutions [11]. Th  ese 
improved processes include the increased quantity and 
timeliness of mandatory case reporting; decreased data-
entry burden on public health programs; provision of 
tools needed for emergency preparedness (e.g., rapid 
awareness of new cases, linkages to automatic alerting 
systems for public health personnel); and management 
support necessary during outbreak situations [12].
PHI also oﬀ  ers paper-to-digital conversion techniques 
and tools that empower and enable epidemiologists and 
surveillance practitioners to work better, faster, and 
cheaper [13] by providing health information, including 
any information about individuals demonstrated to be 
related to health (e.g., medical records, laboratory 
reports, behavioral risk factors, medical examiner and 
vital records, school records)  that is more complete, 
speciﬁ  c, and timely [14-16].
Movement 3 – Alignment of security and public health
Th  e third movement aligns the overlapping, mutual 
interests of the security and public health communities 
around the domain of public health surveillance. It forces 
policy discussion, increases focus, as well as provides 
sources to drive progress. Th  e  WHO’s 2007 World Health 
Report, “A safer future: global public health in the 21st 
century”, addresses the interface of health and security 
[17]. Th  e following points are noted in the foreword: 
“Given today’s universal vulnerability to [internationally 
signiﬁ  cant health and security] threats, better security 
calls for global solidarity… as the determinant and conse-
quences of health emergencies have become broader, so 
has the range of players with a stake in the security 
agenda … successful implementation of the IHR(2005) 
serves the interests of politicians and business leaders as 
well as the health, trade and tourism sectors.”
Additionally, World Health Assembly Resolutions 
54.14 and 55.16, respectively, requested the WHO to 
“provide technical support to Member States for develop-
ing intervention programmes that prevent epidemics and 
respond to communicable disease threats and 
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investiga  tions, laboratory diagnoses and community and 
clinical management of cases” and “to continue, in 
consultation with relevant intergovernmental agencies 
and other inter  national organizations, to strengthen 
global surveil  lance of infectious diseases, water quality, 
and food safety, and related activities such as the revision 
of the International Health Regulations and development 
of WHO’s food safety strategy, by coordinating 
information gathering on potential health risks and 
disease outbreaks, data veriﬁ   cation, analysis and 
dissemination, by providing support to laboratory 
networks, and by making a strong contribution to any 
international humanitarian response, as required.” 
[18,19].
Th   e WHO plays a role in the international response to 
accidental or deliberate use of biological and chemical 
agents or radio-nuclear materials that aﬀ  ect health. Th  ey 
have a vision for international public health security, ready 
to respond collectively to the threat of epidemics and other 
public health emergencies, both natural and man-made. 
Correspondingly, WHO has adopted mechanisms for 
supporting countries and stren  gthen  ing the international 
response [10].
Among global public health stakeholders there now 
seems to exist both the political will and an acknow-
ledged, if yet undeﬁ  ned, overlapping interest and mutual 
beneﬁ   t to achieving comprehensive, eﬀ   ective and eﬃ   -
cient global, multiple-hazard public health surveil  lance. 
Th   ere are areas where security and public health interests 
are seen to be at odds. However, some countries may not 
wish to share public health information with other 
countries that may be used for the security or economic 
advantage of the other nation. Th  ese perceptions have 
been a challenge to global public health surveillance in 
recent years and may be considered a key challenge going 
forward.
Eight keys to comprehensive health protection
In order for these three movements to empower and 
enhance surveillance competencies and lead to the end-
state perspective described here, eight prerequisites or 
conditions should be in place (Figure 1). Th  ey include 
politics, policies, priorities, perspectives, procedures, 
Figure 1. Eight Keys to Comprehensive Health Protection and their Relationship to the Eight Core Capacities of the International Health 
Regulations 2005.
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eight prerequisites have a loosely sequential nature, there 
are relationships and interdependencies among them 
that should be acknowledged because of critical linkages 
to core competencies of public health surveillance and 
action (Figure 2).
Many challenges (gaps and impediments) exist between 
the current and end-state described here. Th  ey can be 
disaggregated into technical, logistic, governance, and 
ﬁ  nancial domains. Within the technical domain, single 
(silo) categorical, disease-speciﬁ   c surveillance systems 
create the situation where public health practitioners 
cannot determine relationships between health condi-
tions or co-morbidities (e.g., through data linkages). For 
example, new tuberculosis (TB) cases could be missed 
because HIV/AIDS data are not cross-matched with the 
TB registry. In this situation, surveillance becomes 
ineﬀ  ective, because it is incomplete; events that represent 
a public health threat or that could inform about a 
potential public health threat are missed. Many times 
disease-speciﬁ  c silos are created and sustained by single 
funding streams and corresponding program obligations 
and priorities. Th  ey are often then maintained by pro-
gram corporate cultures. Secondly, appropriate public 
health information is often not collected because what 
needs to be measured is often not known [20,21]. In these 
circumstances, surveillance systems are not ﬂ  exible 
enough to respond to new or unusual presentations of 
disease, events, or conditions (i.e., not easily adapted to 
changing information needs). Th  irdly, current surveil-
lance systems are often not timely (i.e., by the time an 
event of interest or concern is detected, the opportunity 
to intervene has passed) [22]. Additionally, some new 
surveillance systems are neither eﬀ  ective, nor eﬃ   cient 
(i.e, the delivery of needed information is dependent on 
an inordinate number of resources) [23]. Th   e logistic gaps 
include technical disparities among Member States, such 
as the cost for internet access and IT infrastructure. Gaps 
also exist in surveillance practices (e.g., lacking legal or 
other administrative requirements for mandatory 
reporting).
Th  ere is a critical gap in global governance, under 
which all Member States would agree to function. 
Countries now collect and communicate public health 
information within and outside their natural border. Th  e 
amount and type of information and willingness to 
collaborate varies from region to region. While there is a 
justiﬁ  able need to share important public health infor-
mation that might impact neighboring states (and the 
IHR[2005] provides the legal and technical framework 
for public health emergencies of international concern), 
there still exists some uncertainty about what types of 
public health information are appropriate, how they 
should be communicated, and how quickly they should 
be shared.
Challenges (or impediments) to bridge the gaps include 
both the lack of trust and perceived beneﬁ  t at various 
levels, the lack of a global governance model to address 
power and control of public health information, and the 
lack of focused ﬁ  nancial support from global partners.
Conclusions
End-state perspective for global public health surveillance
Enhancing global public health surveillance in the 21st 
century involves empowering and enabling existing 
public health surveil  lance systems to interoperate (i.e., 
one information system to communicate with another 
syntactically – mean  ing two or more systems are capable 
of communi  cat  ing and exchanging data by using speciﬁ  ed 
data formats and communication protocols; and 
semantically – meaning the ability of computer systems 
to communicate information and have that information 
properly interpreted by the receiving system in the same 
sense as intended by the transmitting system). 
Surveillance systems should also be enjoined (or 
integrated – meaning streamlining data collection among 
systems to reduce redundancy of the data collected 
where it makes sense to do so). Th   ese activities will lead 
Table 1. Eight Keys to Comprehensive Health Protection and their Defi  ning Features.
Key Defi  ning Features
Politics  public demand; general consensus; mutual interest
Policies  governance; stewardship; respect for human rights and data ownership; best practices
Priorities  shared vision; acceptance of accountability; embracing strategic and system’s thinking; seeing a common way forward; fi  nding synergy; 
  leveraging existing strengths
Perspectives  facility; community; district; regional; national; global
Procedures  review global best practices; assess standard operating procedures; delineate lines of authority; establish channels of communication; 
  intervene and re-evalaute
Practices  assess existing workfl  ow; evaluate eff  ectiveness and effi   ciency
Preparation  training; transparency; forthrightness; one size does not fi  t all
Payers  local and national governments; global programs
McNabb BMC Public Health 2010, 10(Suppl 1):S3 
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/10/S1/S3
Page 4 of 7to universal global access to interoperable public health 
information when it’s needed, where it’s needed. In the 
process sense, interoperable and integrated public health 
information means achieving eﬀ   ective and eﬃ   cient 
public health business practices and workﬂ  ow 
empowered and enabled to be better, faster, and cheaper 
by IT.
Operationally, comprehensive, global public health 
surveil  lance means one sign-on access to authorized and 
necessary public health information. Public health infor-
mation includes other information – when combined 
with health-related information – that provides a picture 
of population or community health. Consumers should 
have one-stop shopping for public health information; 
and there should be one source for integration of public 
health information for all users. Th  is also means one 
common set of standards for “bringing together” or 
interoperating existing or new data streams. Most impor-
tantly, one size does not ﬁ  t all.
Demographic, clinical, laboratory and other informa-
tion about patients with diseases of public health 
signiﬁ  cance should only have to be entered once, saving 
time and resources. Th  e local, district, national, or 
inter  national health authorities should be able to access 
real-time health outcome data and perform analyses or 
take timely and appropriate public health action based on 
that information. It should be stressed that keeping 
electronic health information private, conﬁ  dential, and 
secure while automatically and immediately electronically 
communi  cating public health information to local public 
health authorities to satisfy mandatory public health 
reporting purposes is critical. Diﬀ  erent reporting systems 
may be in existence depending on the types of data and 
information being reported, purpose and urgency of 
relaying the information, and where the data/information 
is being reported.
Th  is perspective embraces and mitigates the tension 
between two fundamental human rights. Th  e  ﬁ  rst is the 
human right to privacy, conﬁ  dentiality, and security of 
personal health information. Th   is includes any infor  ma-
tion about individuals demonstrated to be related to 
health (e.g., medical records, laboratory reports, behavioral 
risk factors, medical examiner and vital records, school 
records) and the right of sovereign, national entities to 
the ownership and authority over their citizens’ public 
health information. Th  e second is the human right of 
Figure 2. Relationships and Dependencies among the Eight Keys of Comprehensive Health Protection to Comprehensive Eff  ective and 
Effi   cient Global Public Health Surveillance.
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information that might impact their lives.
Data management requires much more than invest-
ment in technology; it involves how data are created, 
stored, moved, used, and retired. As opposed to the 20th 
century replicated database model, a federated model of 
public health information sharing allows multiple partici-
pants to share data without having to give up ownership, 
thus accommodating universal access to public health 
information [24]. A federated model is a type of meta-
database management system that transparently inte-
grates multiple autonomous database systems into a 
single one. Th   e constituent databases are interconnected 
via a computer network, and may be geographically 
decen  tralized. Since the constituent database systems 
remain autonomous, a federated database (or virtual 
database) is the fully-integrated, logical composite of all 
constituent databases.
One mechanism to achieve this federated model is 
through a global public health grid (http://cdc.confex.
com/cdc/phin2009/webprogram/Paper21091.html) 
(Figure 3). Th   e goal of the grid is to improve population 
health by facilitating timely and reliable global public 
health information exchange. Th   e global grid has the core 
principles of long-term sustainability; low barrier to 
entry (technically, ﬁ   nancially and socially); and uses a 
standards-based approach that is reusable, collaborative, 
and open source.
Recommendations
Th   e way forward that addresses the gaps and challenges 
to achieve the end-state paradigm described here for 
comprehensive, eﬀ   ective and eﬃ   cient,  multiple-hazard 
global public health surveillance lies through incor  pora-
tion of these key principles:
1.  People are key and listening is important – true 
partnership takes this into account.
2. Transparency builds trust and is crucial to success.
3.  Mutual respect and mutual beneﬁ   t are vital and 
necessary. Th  is includes a full recognition of data 
owner  ship, national sovereignty, and the rights of 
individual patients.
4. Competence, relevance, and a common language in 
public health practice are required.
5. A culture of responsible stewardship and quality data 
is mandatory.
6. While one-size-does-not-ﬁ  t-all, a set of core capacities 
does exist [25]. Each Member State should proactively 
Figure 3. Envisioned Architecture of Global Public Health Grid.
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to identify and address gaps.
Adopting these guiding principles, the global community 
should carefully circumscribe the overlapping interest, 
shared vision, and mutual beneﬁ   t of the security and 
public health communities within the domain of public 
health surveillance and deﬁ  ne the boundaries of those 
mutual interests. Finally, a global forum should be 
established to guide consensus governance required for 
public health information sharing in the 21st century. 
Once the impediments of power and control of data are 
recognized, respected, and addressed, universal access to 
public health information can occur.
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